joseph p farrel's take on the latest events in donbas and possible reasons behind merkel/hollande unplanned journey to moscow - form his yesterday's 'news and views' :
joseph p farrel's take on the latest events in donbas and possible reasons behind merkel/hollande unplanned journey to moscow - form his yesterday's 'news and views' :
news just in via rt
http://rt.com/news/230123-putin-hollande-merkel-talks/
to say:
Putin, Hollande, Merkel talks on Ukraine ‘constructive’, possible document in progress – Kremlin
one would hope, saga close to over.
by Alexander Mercouris, London
Talks in Moscow
On 7th February 2015
"I am coming increasingly round to the view of Alastair Newman that Merkel and Hollande came with no plan to Moscow but with the purpose of having what diplomats call "a full and frank discussion" in private with Putin looking at all the issues in the one place in Europe - the Kremlin - where they can be confident the Americans are not spying on them. That must be why they sent their officials away.
It is also clear that Merkel's and Hollande's visit to Kiev before their flight to Moscow was just for show.
Poroshenko's officials are insisting that the question of federalisation was not discussed during Poroshenko's meeting with Hollande and Merkel. Hollande has however now come out publicly to support "autonomy" for the eastern regions i.e. federalisation, which makes it a virtual certainty that in the meeting in Moscow it was discussed. The point is that Merkel and Hollande did not want to discuss federalisation with Poroshenko because they know the junta adamantly opposes the idea and did not want him to veto it before the meeting in Moscow had even begun.
The problem is that since everyone pretends that federalisation is an internal Ukrainian issue to be agreed freely between the two Ukrainian sides, its terms will only be thrashed out once constitutional negotiations between the two Ukrainian sides begin. Since the junta will never willingly agree to federalisation, in reality its form will have to be hammered out in private by Moscow after consultations with the NAF and with Berlin and Paris and then imposed on the junta in the negotiations.
Saying this shows how fraught with difficulty this whole process is going to be.
Not only are there plenty of people in the Donbass who now oppose federalisation (and some in Moscow too I suspect) but this whole process if it is to work would somehow have to get round the roadblock of the Washington hardliners, who will undoubtedly give their full support to the junta as it tries to obstruct a process over which it has a theoretical veto. Frankly, I wonder whether it can be done.
If the process is to have any chance of success then Merkel and Hollande must screw up the courage to do what they failed to do last spring and summer, which is publicly stand up to the hardliners in Washington and Kiev and impose their will upon them. Are they really willing to do that? Given how entrenched attitudes have become over the last few months and given the false position Merkel and Hollande put themselves in by so strongly supporting Kiev, the chances of them pulling this off look much weaker than they did last spring.
I would add a few more points;
1. There is one major difference between the situation now and in the Spring, which might offer some hope of movement.
Anyone reading the Western media now cannot fail but see that there is a growing sense of defeat. Sanctions have failed to work, the Ukrainian economy is disintegrating and the junta's military is being defeated.
That was not the case last spring, when many in the West had convinced themselves that the junta would win the military struggle with the NAF. The confrontation strategy Merkel opted for in July based on that belief has totally and visibly failed. It is not therefore surprising if she is now looking for a way-out by reviving some of the ideas that were being floated by the Russians in the spring. She now has a political imperative to look for a solution in order to avoid the appearance of defeat, which would leave her position both in Germany and Europe badly weakened. That political imperative was not there in the spring. It is now. In a sense the pressure is now on her.
2. I should stress that it is Merkel who is Putin's key interlocutor. The reason Hollande is there and appears to be taking the lead is to provide Merkel with cover. The one thing Merkel cannot afford politically is the appearance of a Moscow-Berlin stitch-up that the hardliners in Washington, Kiev, London, Warsaw and the Baltic States will claim is a new Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact to divide Europe into German and Russian spheres of influence. Whether we like it or not in Germany the shadow of Hitler still hangs heavy and exposes Berlin to endless moral blackmail whenever it tries to pursue with Moscow an independent course. That is why Merkel needs Hollande present when she meets Putin for talks of the sort she's just had in Moscow.
3. One other possible sign of hope is that there is some evidence that a sea-change in European and especially German opinion may be underway.
Whatever the purpose of the ongoing debate in Washington about sending weapons to the junta, whether it is a serious proposal or an attempt to secure diplomatic leverage or a combination of the two, it has horrified opinion in Europe, bringing home to many people there how fundamentally nihilistic US policy has become.
All the talk in the Western media yesterday and this morning is of a split between Europe and the US. That is going much too far. However for the first time there is public disagreement in Europe with Washington on the Ukrainian question. Whether that crystallises into an actual break with Washington leading to a serious and sustained European attempt to reach a diplomatic solution to the Ukrainian crisis against Washington's wishes is an altogether different question. I have to say that for the moment I very much doubt it.
4. I remain deeply pessimistic about this whole process. The best opportunity to settle this conflict diplomatically was last spring. I cannot help but feel that as Peter Lavelle said on the Crosstalk in which I appeared yesterday, the train has now left the station.
A peaceful solution to the Ukrainian conflict ultimately depends on European resolve to face down the hardliners in Washington and Kiev. It is going to be much harder to do this now than it was last year.
Moreover, despite the bad news on the economy and on the front line in Debaltsevo, the hardliners in Kiev are bound to have been emboldened by all the talk in Washington about sending them arms, which is going to make the effort to bring them round even harder than it already is.
The besetting problem of this whole crisis is that the Europeans have never shown either the resolve or the realism to face the hardliners down though it is certainly within their power to do so. In Merkel's case one has to wonder whether her heart is in it anyway. My view remains that this situation will only be resolved by war, and that the negotiations in Moscow will prove just another footnote to that.
5. If I am wrong and some autonomy really is granted to the Donbass, then I make one confident prediction. This is that the Ukraine will in that case disintegrate even more rapidly than it would have done if federalisation had been agreed upon last spring or summer.
Following such a terrible war, I cannot see people in the Donbass accepting federalisation as anything other than a stepping stone to eventual secession and union with Russia. If the Donbass secures autonomy, I cannot see people in places like Odessa and Kharkov failing to press for an at least equivalent degree of autonomy to that granted to the Donbass. If the Europeans are prepared to see the Donbass achieve autonomy, by what logic can they deny it to the people of Odessa and Kharkov?
More to the point, the November elections showed the emergence of what looks like an increasingly strong potential autonomy or even independence movement in Galicia.
Given that a terrible war has been fought and lost in the east to defeat "separatism" in the Donbass, and given the widespread disillusion with the junta in Kiev, it is difficult to see how many people in Galicia will not feel betrayed if the grant of federalisation to the Donbass is now imposed on them after so many of their men died to prevent it. If in reaction Galicia presses for the same sort of autonomy as the Donbass - which it could well do - then the Ukraine is finished. I doubt it would hold together for more than a few months. If federalisation had been granted last spring or summer before the war began then it is possible - likely even - that the Ukraine could have been held together in a sort of state of suspended animation at least for a while. I don't think there's much chance of that now."
Breaking!!! Nuke Just Went Off In Donetsk, Ukraine! Feb. 08, 2015
CRIMINALS IN CHARGE
Published on Feb 8, 2015Purportedly, a nuke has just been detonated in Ukraine.
Донецк Мощнейший, мать его, взрыв! 08 02 15 Translated: Donetsk powerful ****ing blast! 08 February 15
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=Hh3W8d...em-uploademail
It must be fake Ria, the bang came before the light ( visual ).
I have no reference to see whether this is true or false.
The comments under the vid on youtube seems to agree that its a fake message.
Probably a huge bomb or some plant/factory blowup. But not a Nuke.. Or so the majority there seems to believe.
With Love
Eelco
Have a great day today
not nuclear, but something fancy it is..,probably TOCHKA ..i will upload vid later on, also see if i can find anything else to support this really was tochka.Originally posted by Ria
via vinyardofthesaker with connections on the ground:
"The crater is about 10m (30 ft) deep. It is located on the territory of a chemical factory, but it did not hit any of the main buildings. Whether there was any building at the actual location of the explosion is impossible to tell: the earth is black, all the trees scorched and there is nothing left at all. DNR experts estimate the blast as being the equivalent of 1 ton of TNT. The sound of the explosion was heard 50km away. From the shape of the crater, it doe not appear to be a fuel-air explosive (FAE), but 1 ton of equivalent TNT is way bigger than the 500kg HE warhead the Tochka-U can carry. This leads me to believe that the Ukrainians might have used a new weapon or, at least, a modified one. All we know for sure is that it was not a nuclear device. Also, it makes me wonder what in the world they were trying to hit - maybe the chemicals factory, but if that it the case, then the missed by 1000m or so. At this point, I honestly don't know. I also want to remind everybody that the junta has used White Phosphorus again against its own population."
--------------
post edit:
here's a rus. blog in english i find the same video ria is linking to:
not a nuke, some massive missile according to comments.
http://fortruss.blogspot.co.uk/2015/...tsk-video.html
Last edited by Elbie, 9th February 2015 at 18:47.
Ria (9th February 2015)
My understanding is a bang comes from the shock waves after. I'm no bom expert but then is any one here?
Elbie has found material that supports something happened...
official information regading last night's explosion by doentsk people's republic military representative (from minute 3.27):
Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dSMSrwSoAaY
---
post update:
What's inside in the Debaltsevo cauldron? Why did the leaders of Europe rush to Russia?
Admittedly, when "the mousetrap" began to shut, everyone began to shout about the need... the need of what? Oh, about the need to follow the Minsk agreements..
The "Debaltsevo cauldron" was intended as a "Debaltsevo springboard" to start a victorious attack on DPR and LPR. In this regard, huge quantities of weapons, ammunition and food was brought to this area. This was confirmed by the militia after the capture of Uglegorsk. They got arsenals overflowing with weapons and warehouses with American food.
To foolishly lose such volume of weapons and "illegal American aid" for tens and hundreds of millions of dollars, and then to beg for the "ultimate weapon to defeat Putin" - this is the height of idiocy and helplessness of senior command.
Likely for this reason, to rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of sponsors, the Ukrainian offensive started today on all fronts at once, and with a simultaneous request for a truce...
It is a madhouse, and not a government and a General staff! They are so unpredictable, that honestly, it's laughable! And yet, there are theories that in the arsenals of Debaltsevo one will find phosphorous and cluster shells and bombs, banned by international conventions, but used by the Ukrainian armed forces during the shelling of cities and towns. This could be evidence of war crimes...
http://fortruss.blogspot.co.uk/2015/...on-hiding.html
Last edited by Elbie, 9th February 2015 at 19:44. Reason: post update
published on Feb 8th - joaqin flores
the latest round of cease fire talks (cautious not to say 'peace') is on in minsk as of this morning.
all leaders planned for agreement signing (germany, russia, france and ukraine) flew in, which has to be a good sign.
400 journalists/reporters are following the event.
enough of this:
Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IbU22tJpyLQ
-----------
post update
apparently, flags are ready for leaders' photo. security says first guests expected to arrive at around 5pm..so we won't get to hear anything until much later this evening.
Last edited by Elbie, 11th February 2015 at 12:57. Reason: post update
BabaRa (11th February 2015)
the cease fire accord's been signed.
there remains ONE BIG controversy in that poroshenko does not know thousands of his forces are trapped in debeltsevo area or he knows, but won't admit/discuss it. i think it's the latter - he is understandably scared for his own life.. he is running a great chance of being suicided by his colleagues back in kiev - their official line is that UKR army is victorious in donbas.
the other party in this agreement (people's repuplics of donetsk and lugansk) gave a statement earlier:
The Minsk "Agreement"
by Alexander Mercouris
"Already, there is debate about who has "won" and who has "lost" in the Minsk talks.
The short answer is that as the German foreign minister Steinmeier correctly said there is no breakthrough but the Russians and the NAF have made progress.
One point needs to be explained or reiterated (since I have explained it already and many times).
The agreement does not make provision for federalisation or autonomy for the Donbass but still only refers to the grant of a law according the Donbass temporary special status within the Ukraine.
There could not be an agreement for federalisation out of the Minsk negotiations because they are primarily a summit meeting of five powers - Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, German and France. The Russians have always insisted that this is an internal conflict and civil war within the Ukraine and between Ukrainians and it is for the Ukrainians and them alone to resolve their internal differences between them through negotiations.
Given that this is Russia's stance, Russia and the other powers cannot impose a federalisation scheme on the Ukrainians and they have not - at least overtly - sought to do so. What the stated objective of the Minsk talks is - at least from the Russian point of view - is to set up conditions and a process for the constitutional negotiations that the Russians have been pushing for (and which were supposedly agreed on 21st February 2014 and on 17th April 2014 and 5th September 2014) to take place.
The Russians have been insisting on these negotiations since the February coup. The Russians are not publicly pre-ordaining the outcome of those negotiations because were they to do so they would not be negotiations at all. Whatever a negotiation is, it is by definition not something whose outcome is preordained.
If the Russians sought to preordain the outcome of the negotiations by insisting on federalisation as the outcome they would be imposing their views on the parties and would be admitting that they are a party to the conflict, which is what they have consistently said they are not. They would in effect be doing what the US has tried to do in the Syrian conflict, which is insist on an outcome to negotiations (Assad's resignation) before negotiations even take place. The Russians have always opposed this sort of behaviour and they are being consistent in not openly adopting it now.
Depending on what the parties agree between them, the negotiations could in theory result in decentralisation, federalisation, a confederation or even outright independence for the Donbass (the Russians floated that idea as a serious possibility in the summer). The latter is not by the way contrary to the reaffirmation of respect or even support for the Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity that we saw in the statement today. If the internal parties to the conflict were to decide on a formal partition as the solution to the Ukraine's conflict, then international actors like Russia could recognise it without calling into question their previous declared support for the Ukraine's territorial integrity, as they previously did when Czechoslovakia split up.
In reality everybody knows that the Russians' preferred option is federalisation and the Europeans are now edging towards that solution. Whether it is a viable solution is another matter.
Once this key point is understood everything else starts to fall into place.
Last spring and summer the Russians sought a ceasefire so the constitutional negotiations could begin. The Europeans are now also demanding a ceasefire (they were less keen on the idea last spring and summer). There is now therefore an agreement for a ceasefire.
Back in August the Russians demanded the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the Donbass. There is now an agreement for the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the Donbass.
If that happens it will be a major weakening of the Junta's position in the Donbass because it is the Junta whose military has the big preponderance in heavy weapons. If the opposing sides are left with light infantry forces, the advantage on the ground will pass decisively to the NAF.
The political machinery that was supposed to have been agreed in Minsk on 5th September 2014 to create the conditions for the constitutional elections is being revived. Thus there is to be a law of special status for the Donbass pending the constitutional negotiations to clarify its current legal status and provide legal mechanisms for its internal administration by the NAF (Ukraine passed one previously and then reneged on it), more elections etc.
There is a new provision, which is the first indications of some sort of timeline for this process with the constitutional negotiations supposed to have been concluded by the end of the year.
There are also some ideas for a beefed up monitoring process via the OSCE.
Will any of this happen? Highly doubtful I would say. Consider what happened after the Minsk process of 5th September 2014. The Junta did not withdraw its heavy weapons. It did not retreat to the agreed boundary line. It imposed an economic blockade on the Donbass (it is now obliged to lift it). It rescinded the law on the Donbass's special status. It reinforced its army and in January it attempted to renew its offensive.
Is there any more prospect of this process succeeding than did the one that was agreed in Minsk in September?
The big difference between this process and the previous process is that the Europeans are now formally involved. Its success or failure ultimately depends on whether the Europeans are going to insist on the Junta fulfilling its obligations. They spectacularly failed to do so before and I have to say I think it is very unlikely they will do so now. If the Europeans fail to insist on the Junta fulfilling its obligations then the process will unravel as the previous Minsk process did and with the balance of advantage continuing to shift every day on the ground towards the NAF we will see a further renewal of the fighting and a further NAF advance in the spring.
In the meantime control of the border, disarmament of "illegal armed groups" etc are now overtly linked to the successful conclusion of the constitutional negotiations, which is supposed to happen before the end of the year. Of course if the constitutional negotiations succeed, then when all these things happen we will have a different Ukraine from the one we have now. At that point the control of border posts etc will be in the hands of differently constituted authorities from those that exist today.
Will those negotiations actually happen? Will they succeed if they do? I doubt it. The Junta will resist them tooth and nail if only because those negotiations put in jeopardy the whole Maidan project and by their mere fact call into question the Junta's legitimacy.
It depends in the end on what the Europeans do. This has been true of the conflict from the start.
That it depends on what the Europeans do is in itself a good reason to doubt this process will succeed. The probability is more conflict down the road but in the meantime Poroshenko's admission that there is "no good news for the Ukraine" from this process tells us who is winning."
sandy (12th February 2015)
Ukraine is really rendered powerless in their own destiny IMHO.
farrel's latest on the subject of minsk 2, also, putin's supposed threat to disclose 911 satelite files.
personally, i doubt putin's 911 satelite files story..russians incl. putin are not known to threaten, they just do with immediate effect. they make no announcments in long advance. besides, this is an old story like farrel explains.
sandy (14th February 2015)
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