What The New World Order Is, What it Isn't, And Can It Be Demonstrated?

[Emil El Zapato]

If I had a choice between these two, I would not choose Stranahan.

"Once inside Sputnik’s K Street studio, I sat in on the taping of the main morning show, “Fault Lines,” which is something like a mix of the old TV series “Crossfire” and the conspiracy theory site Infowars. The show is hosted by Lee Stranahan, the former Breitbart reporter who the New York Times said had upended an Idaho town with his exaggerated reporting on a juvenile sex crime, and Garland Nixon, a self-professed Bernie Sanders supporter, former cop and board member of the ACLU. (Stranahan told me he stands by his Idaho reporting.) They pride themselves on coming from two different sides of the aisle, though over a month of listening to them, I rarely heard them disagree."

I don't know Fred, when I was studying historical philosophers I asked the Professor why we never studied 'normal' people/philosophers. I don't recall his actual answer but it was something to the effect that we studied people of 'note'.

It is likely that if I professed a love of Satan and said it loud enough and long enough on the web, I could garner some attention but would it add any real philosophical content leading to a better world? Or would it just perpetuate the cycle of this and that. Progress is difficult and requires the extremes to fuel the energetic motion, but the danger are those that make good arguments yet are reactionary at their core. And that by definition is counterproductive. Putin has no moral argument that would justify his existence. That's my extreme view.

[Fred Steeves]

Good montages have a way of bringing things on back home. The rest of the world outside of "the golden billion" has already long been aware that the rules of the "Rules Based International Order" change with the direction of the political winds, the golden rule has been smile and tread lightly, lest the rules committee decides on amendments to your detriment:

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EWRpjbMBCLY




But as Bob Dylan aptly put it: "The Times They Are A-Changin"

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s3qndXvBmr0

[Fred Steeves]

Time is coming for Taiwan to step up and do it's part to gravely weaken competition to the Rules Based International Order.

Senator Lindsey Graham has a way of getting straight to the point on matters of death and destruction.

First, the Ukrainians fight to the last man to weaken competitor #1:

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HkbwZCqn7BY




Then, Taiwan fights to the last man to weaken competitor #2:
https://www.youtube.com/shorts/Or66MDeVc3M

Well, that's the plan anyway. None of this is senseless when the plan becomes clear.

Any volunteers to sacrifice it all in putting competitor #3 in it's place?

[Fred Steeves]

Even more explicit, straight from an ex general. This is a proud spokesman for the current, but fading world order, laying it out in no uncertain terms the plans to maintain its standing.

Crush the competition via expendable proxies:
[TWITTER]https://twitter.com/CarlZha/status/1631485715480723457[/TWITTER]

[Diabolical Boids]

Even more explicit, straight from an ex general. This is a proud spokesman for the current, but fading world order, laying it out in no uncertain terms the plans to maintain its standing.

Crush the competition via expendable proxies:
[TWITTER]https://twitter.com/CarlZha/status/1631485715480723457[/TWITTER]

It was exactly this sort of mindset that got us into the Vietnamese war, a long drawn out conflict that went no where as far as America is concerned like Afghanistan, and pretty much resulted in embarrassment. America wants a long drawn-out conflict, thinking it will wear its opponents out when likely that is the same strategy Russia and China will use as well. America doesn't do well in long drawn out conflicts. America doesn't seem to realize that but I have a sketchy feeling Russia and China are aware of this and can afford to wait America out. America would have a better chance if it gave some serious thought to what Russia and the Chinese want (or anyone really) and stop thinking they Russians and the Chinese want what America wants.

[Emil El Zapato]

It was exactly this sort of mindset that got us into the Vietnamese war, a long drawn out conflict that went no where as far as America is concerned like Afghanistan, and pretty much resulted in embarrassment. America wants a long drawn-out conflict, thinking it will wear its opponents out when likely that is the same strategy Russia and China will use as well. America doesn't do well in long drawn out conflicts. America doesn't seem to realize that but I have a sketchy feeling Russia and China are aware of this and can afford to wait America out. America would have a better chance if it gave some serious thought to what Russia and the Chinese want (or anyone really) and stop thinking they Russians and the Chinese want what America wants.

Some truth, despite that I don't feel that strongly about freedom of speech because of the way that 'right' is used in modern society, but doesn't every 'citizen' want freedom of speech, freedom for the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness (honestly, it could be argued that not everyone does want that).

I've come to believe that contrary to popular perception the U.S. is fighting a proxy war for Ukraine rather than the other way around.

[Emil El Zapato]

UKRAINE AND PROXY WAR: IMPROVING ONTOLOGICAL SHORTCOMINGS IN MILITARY THINKING

Ukrainian armor and soldiers seen in Yavoriv, Ukraine, during Rapid Trident 2022

Though often overlooked or misinterpreted, proxy war is an important component of armed conflict. Policymakers and practitioners must understand the nuance of proxy war to avoid making missteps in policy and practice.

IN BRIEF

• Though often overlooked or misinterpreted, proxy war is an important component of armed conflict. Policymakers and practitioners must understand the nuance of proxy war to avoid making missteps in policy and practice.
• A proxy war can take the form of the more-recognized traditional model or of the technology diffusion model. In the traditional model, a principal actor uses a proxy for the day-to-day rigors of combat against an enemy. But in the technology diffusion model, a principal actor provides its agent with financing, weapons, training and equipment.
• Recognizing proxy war’s subcategories, and not misidentifying them as either a coalition or an alliance, is crucial to crafting policy, strategy, plans and doctrine.

INTRODUCTION
Proxy war is an underappreciated component of warfare. In many cases, proxy war is omitted from discussions of international armed conflict, relegated to non-international armed conflict and the realm of non-state actors. This taxonomy is incorrect because it overlooks the ways in which state actors use other state actors, in addition to non-state actors, to engage in proxy war.

Further, Western militaries and pundits alike tend to place proxy war in a category outside the bounds of acceptable practice. Instead, they often label proxy war a nefarious activity conducted by cynical strategic actors.1 To be sure, a quick scan of U.S. Army doctrine, for instance, yields scant mention of proxy war, and when proxy war is mentioned, it is applied to non-state actors and to how an adversary operates.2 This is also an incorrect categorization of proxy war.

These two ontological misconceptions are the primary factors derailing a clear understanding of how proxy war fits both within warfare and within war as a whole. The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War provides the defense and security studies communities a ripe opportunity to review their understanding of proxy war and to rectify ontological incongruencies.

The Russo-Ukrainian War demonstrates that proxy wars are not solely the action of cynical, revanchist actors operating through non-state actors. Rather, it is a striking example of how state actors fight proxy wars through other state actors. To that end, multiple Western nations are engaged in a proxy war against Russia to support and defend democratic ideals, the rule of law and the international system.3 However, to see beyond proxy war’s ontological misgivings, and square the circle, a solid theoretical foundation is required. This paper, building on existing proxy war literature, seeks to provide that foundation by introducing two forms of proxy war: the traditional model and the technology diffusion model. This paper builds on those two forms of proxy war and asserts that each form contains two subcategories: state actor and non-state actor. In short, this paper adds to the existing literature on proxy war by injecting four new named and categorized subjects into the field’s taxonomy to overcome the ontological shortcomings of proxy war.

PROXY WARS—A TAXONOMY
A proxy war is armed conflict, whether international armed conflict or non-international armed conflict, in which one side (or more) uses an intermediary as its primary combat force to achieve its strategic aims.4 Within proxy wars, five basic strategic relationships exist: coercive, exploitative, transactional, cultural or contractual.5 Those relationships guide the interaction between principal and proxy (see Figure 1). Further, the unique structure of each strategic relationship governs what a principal can expect from, and accomplish with, its proxy. These five relationships come to life in proxy war’s two basic forms—the traditional model and the technology diffusion model (see Figure 2).

Figure 1: Five Models of Proxy War

Figure 2: Two Forms of Proxy War

TRADITIONAL MODEL
Proxy war’s traditional model results from a principal actor using a proxy for the day-to-day rigors of combat against an enemy. This is the most common form of proxy war and what most people envision when “proxy war” is mentioned. The use of combat advisors, especially at the tactical level, is one of the primary indicators of this form of proxy war. Iran’s use of Iraq-based Shia militia groups to combat the U.S. military during both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Inherent Resolve are recent examples of this form of proxy war, something to which the U.S. military can easily relate.6

Two subcategories exist within the traditional model. The first subcategory occurs when a state actor uses a non-state actor as its proxy. This category aligns with the Iranian model described in the previous paragraph and is the most recognizable form of proxy war.

The second subcategory is less common than the previous, but still pervasive. The second subcategory results from a state actor enlisting another state actor as its proxy, whether explicitly or implicitly, to fight against a common foe. Although it is easy to confuse this subcategory as a coalition or an alliance, it differs in that the principal does not fight alongside the proxy; instead, it provides the proxy with combat support. Combat support often comes in the form of planning, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), targeting, strike and logistics. This category is also characterized by the use of combat advisors, although many of those combat advisors are far closer to the front or fulfill a dual role, both advising and carrying out combat support.

As David Lake notes in a contemporary work on proxy war, the United States’ support to the post-Saddam government of Iraq typifies this subcategory.7 In post-Saddam Iraq, the United States developed, financed, equipped and trained the Iraqi security forces.8 The United States then used the Iraqi security forces to combat Iranian interference in Iraq and to lead the U.S. effort to snuff out the growing post-Saddam insurgency.9 The Iraqi security forces fought alongside and, later, in front of U.S. forces during this war.10 That is not to say that the U.S. military did not conduct unilateral operations, because it did. However, as the war progressed, the U.S. military relied more on the Iraqis for combat operations and took a back seat, offering advice, training and logistical support.11

Operation Inherent Resolve, on the other hand, also provides an example of the traditional model’s state actor/state actor subcategory. Despite being outfitted with friendly terms and phrases such as “partner” and “advise and assist,” the United States’ operational and tactical level reliance on the Iraqi security forces to combat the Islamic State meets the definitional requirements of a proxy war.12 U.S. forces provided combat advisors and planning and logistics advisors, and they covered discrete capability gaps for the Iraqis, to include ISR, targeting and precision strike. All of these factors combine to meet the standard for a traditional principal-proxy relationship.13

To reiterate, the traditional model is the most common form of proxy war. Within this model, two subcategories exist—one in which a state actor fights through a non-state actor, and the other in which a state actor fights through a state actor. It is important to remember that the state actor/non-state actor subcategory can be mistaken as a coalition or an alliance, but proxy relationships are discernible by the degree to which participants share tactical and existential risk.14 In situations in which the risk is offloaded to one actor, and the other actor (or actors) remain(s) relatively clear of harm’s way, the situation is likely a proxy war and not a coalition or an alliance.15

TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION MODEL
The technology diffusion model is proxy war’s second form. This model results from the principal providing its agent with financing, weapons, training and equipment instead of indirectly fighting through the proxy. This model is often a third-party actor’s pragmatic response to the actions of an aggressor state against a weaker actor. Further, this form of proxy war is useful for opportunistic principals interested in seeing an adversarial state actor fail in a third-party conflict. The technology diffusion model is often indicated by operational and strategic combat advising, but also by the use of technical advisors. Technical advisors often operate in third-party countries and train and educate the proxy on the use of foreign-supplied equipment and weapons. The technology diffusion model also has two subcategories.

The first subcategory is the result of a principal providing a non-state actor with financing, weapons, training and other equipment to combat an enemy, but not taking an active role in the fighting itself. This subcategory is fairly common. The United States’ support for the mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989) is perhaps one of the best-known examples of this model.16 The U.S. Stinger missile came to be seen as a meme of U.S. involvement in that war, as the Stinger missile decidedly assisted the mujahideen defeat of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Russia’s support to the Taliban and its affiliates during the U.S. war in Afghanistan (2001–2021) is another example of this proxy arrangement.17

On the other hand, the second subcategory results from the principal providing another state actor with financing, weapons, training and other equipment to combat an enemy, but not taking an active role in fighting. From a historical standpoint, the United States’ support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) is an example of this situation.18 However, the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War is a more tangible illustration of this subcategory.

From a technology diffusion standpoint, the United States has provided Ukraine with military aid exceeding $4.6 billion since February 2022.19 As recently as 31 May 2022, President Biden reiterated the United States’ commitment to Ukraine’s survival and, conversely, the thwarting of Moscow’s policy aims in Ukraine.20 The most recent aid package, valued at $700 million, includes High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), towed 155 millimeter artillery, a panoply of unmanned aerial systems and a wide variety of other weapons and related equipment.21 Furthermore, American combat advisors trained Ukrainian soldiers in Germany on the use and upkeep of the U.S.-provided combat equipment, to include its towed artillery.22

It is important to note that the donation of money, equipment and weapons does not necessarily equate to an actor engaging in proxy war. Stated or unstated, an actor’s involvement meets proxy war criteria mainly based on the intent behind its contributions and the degree of its support. It is also important to remember that press releases, open-source documents and doctrines often obfuscate intent and methods and instead focus on communicating a narrative. To that end, because a state actor is not using the phrase “proxy war” does not mean that they are not engaged in that activity. In both cases, resource commitment and intent—not words—are the surest way to discern if an actor has committed to a proxy war or if it is just providing a needy international actor with support.


CONCLUSION
Proxy wars must always be at the fore of warfare studies because they dominate both international and non-international armed conflict. Further, proxy war’s nuance is important to understand because misunderstandings can cue missteps, from the policy level all the way to the tactical level of war. Providing a clear taxonomy for proxy war, as this paper does, helps overcome ontological shortcomings that also contribute to poor showings in proxy war.

Looking to the future, as the international system continues to rely on a rules-based international order, the student of warfare should expect to see a few trends in future war. First, in cases in which maligned state actors attempt territorial conquest vis-à-vis another state, one should anticipate a pragmatic response from third-party actors. If the third party elects a proxy war strategy, one should expect it to employ the traditional model against adversaries that it expects to defeat relatively soon. However, if the third party assesses a longer, more costly war, but goes with a proxy strategy, one should anticipate the technology diffusion model (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Anticipated Applications

Second, the method of identifying a proxy is less a selection process than it is assessing the available actors and evaluating one’s capacity to create a proxy from the groups of fighters, partisans or like-minded people, then being able to transition it into a coherent force that can be put in the field to combat an adversary. In most cases, proxy selection is pragmatic and dynamic—it is based on how available resources allow for the quickest solution.
Finally, the student of warfare must expect proxy wars to continue at a regular clip in the cycle of violence that permeates the modern world. Proxy war provides policymakers, strategists and practitioners with quick, relatively cheap and low-risk (to oneself) options for the continuation of policy aims. The flexibility of proxy war strategies means that they will remain at the fore of international and non-international armed conflict for the foreseeable future.

★ ★ ★ ★

Lieutenant Colonel Amos C. Fox is an officer in the U.S. Army. He is a PhD candidate at the University of Reading (UK), Deputy Director for Development with the Irregular Warfare Initiative, and he is an associate editor with the Wavell Room. He is also a graduate from the U.S. Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he was awarded the Tom Felts Leadership Award in 2017.

[Octopus Garden]

The New World order, or globalization relied on neo-liberal global trade policy. The U.S can no longer retain it's hegemony through war, but they may be able to do it through their dollar, if they radically pull back from unnecessary conflicts. US has just about everything it needs within its own borders and through its neighbours, Mexico and Canada.

China is strong in population. Unfortunately they have one of the worst demographic and economic problems in the world, so that alone could sink them from within. The US has to stop antagonizing China and just let it collapse on its own. Taiwan is a non-issue. It's being blown up to epic proportions, in a grand act of sabre rattling.

Anyway, get ready for re-industrializing of North America. Let's hope that the formation and strengthening of unions will help offset what will be horrendous inflation as we reboot.

[Emil El Zapato]

The New World order, or globalization relied on neo-liberal global trade policy. The U.S can no longer retain it's hegemony through war, but they may be able to do it through their dollar, if they radically pull back from unnecessary conflicts. US has just about everything it needs within its own borders and through its neighbours, Mexico and Canada.

China is strong in population. Unfortunately they have one of the worst demographic and economic problems in the world, so that alone could sink them from within. The US has to stop antagonizing China and just let it collapse on its own. Taiwan is a non-issue. It's being blown up to epic proportions, in a grand act of sabre rattling.

Anyway, get ready for re-industrializing of North America. Let's hope that the formation and strengthening of unions will help offset what will be horrendous inflation as we reboot.

Right, but I believe that as long as there is conflict it might as well be constrained to the econonic, at least it doesn't by default kill people immediately. The U.S. has historically made huge concessions to China to keep peace and keep the money flowing. The beef between the two is about Taiwan and the encroachment of one's sovereignty for its own AND others. Of course, there is plenty of debate to be had on that.

At some point, in a just and progressive world, technology should have a positive effect on the masses leading to a better existence. The problem is the penchant for selfishness and greed so prevalent in the conservative gene. Nature has to decide what is best for humanity. I suspect what direction that will take, after all, we haven't been the model of success in a creation that is long lasting.

[Diabolical Boids]

Some truth, despite that I don't feel that strongly about freedom of speech because of the way that 'right' is used in modern society, but doesn't every 'citizen' want freedom of speech, freedom for the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness (honestly, it could be argued that not everyone does want that).

I've come to believe that contrary to popular perception the U.S. is fighting a proxy war for Ukraine rather than the other way around.

It's not that rights don't work. No one realizes that rights come with responsibilities. Most people aren't using free speech to exercise their rights responsibly they are just running out of the mouth, bleating about personal grievances or whatever. Responsibility is a fearsome thing for a lot of people.

[Emil El Zapato]

It's not that rights don't work. No one realizes that rights come with responsibilities. Most people aren't using free speech to exercise their rights responsibly they are just running out of the mouth, bleating about personal grievances or whatever. Responsibility is a fearsome thing for a lot of people.

Exactly, not to mention all the misinformation, partial truths, out of context deliberate manipulation, it's horrible. People forget that books and libraries still exist and it is constantly used against them. And contrary to what many believe they fail to recognize in their selfish perspective that they are being held down

[Fred Steeves]

The Wolfowitz Doctrine

Named after one of the original gods of neoconservatism, Paul Wolfowitz, it essentially lays out US global strategy as kingpin of the New World Order under the Bush Sr. administration. The world's only great power after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Want to know why US foreign policy is the way it is, right now for instance? The Wolfowitz Doctrine lays it out very plainly in black and white.

KEY POINTS/EXCERPTS:

· The number one objective of U.S. post-Cold War political and military strategy should be preventing the emergence of a rival superpower.

"Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia.

"There are three additional aspects to this objective: First the U.S must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role."


· Another major U.S. objective should be to safeguard U.S. interests and promote American values.

According to the draft document, the U.S. should aim "to address sources of regional conflict and instability in such a way as to promote increasing respect for international law, limit international violence, and encourage the spread of democratic forms of government and open economic systems."

The draft outlines several scenarios in which U.S. interests could be threatened by regional conflict: "access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, threats to U.S. citizens from terrorism or regional or local conflict, and threats to U.S. society from narcotics trafficking."

The draft relies on seven scenarios in potential trouble spots to make its argument -- with the primary case studies being Iraq and North Korea.


· If necessary, the United States must be prepared to take unilateral action.

There is no mention in the draft document of taking collective action through the United Nations.

The document states that coalitions "hold considerable promise for promoting collective action," but it also states the U.S. "should expect future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies" formed to deal with a particular crisis and which may not outlive the resolution of the crisis.

The document states that what is most important is "the sense that the world order is ultimately backed by the U.S." and that "the United States should be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated" or in a crisis that calls for quick response.

https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/front.../etc/wolf.html

Did anyone raise an eyebrow at not even Western Europe being allowed to become a rival power? Fits neatly with the blowing up of Nord Stream, cheap Russian gas made Germany, with it's formidable industrial base, a possible problem considering current operations.

Does it make sense why Russia and China are two huge bullseye targets? And thus the huge interest in arming Ukraine and Taiwan to the teeth for some dirty work on behalf of Big Brother?

Or anyone else for that matter, even close allies, if they begin to represent even a hint of being a possible fly in the ointment. Here's one to keep an eye on, Australia, who is committing billions upon billions of dollars in incorporating US Virginia Class nuclear subs to their arsenal as a "deterrence" to its largest trading partner, China.

Do they really believe their largest trading partner may be coming for them in the dead of night?

What might the US do to them, should they opt out of that deal, and choose trade with China over the US were they to be given an ultimatum that they can only deal with one, or the other?

[Catsquotl]

Did anyone raise an eyebrow at not even Western Europe being allowed to become a rival power?

Not this european.
I have susspected/known for years the european union was put in place as a front for covert American power struggles.
I think most europeans are done with any european union that exceeds free borders and easy trade.

No one here wants to be part of a european super power. Just go away americans and leave everyone alone..
Same goes for China or Puttin. Go away allready.

[Emil El Zapato]

Not this european.
I have susspected/known for years the european union was put in place as a front for covert American power struggles.
I think most europeans are done with any european union that exceeds free borders and easy trade.

No one here wants to be part of a european super power. Just go away americans and leave everyone alone..
Same goes for China or Puttin. Go away allready.

While desirable Cats, the problem is that since antiquity the Alpha predator, predates. It is nature at its most basic. In a way, it exemplifies the dynamics at all levels of society even at the local level. Do away with outsiders and then you are left to 'play' with internecine struggles of exploitation and predation. It is why, in my opinion, that the need for predation has to be eliminated, of course, as a final goal.

It occurred to me that as a stopgap measure, the cost of predation has to be rendered higher than the rewards. I think this is the fundamental aspect of the economic global war (i.e. modern warfare, which reminds why Putin's invasion of Ukraine met with such consternation and surprise, it was a throwback to the old ways and it wasn't within the immediate apprehension of the civilized global community).

[Catsquotl]

While desirable Cats, the problem is that since antiquity the Alpha predator, predates. It is nature at its most basic.

Good thing I stopped living as nature at its most basic. I'd like to believe I have evolved just a little. Which by no means means I am as free as I'd like to be.
It just means I do whatever I please and think my own thoughts about stuff. I can't stop a bullet. Neither will I put one in somebody else. Unless human nature kicks in off course. Until then I dream and let those dreams guide my actions. I have small dreams unlikely to interfere with the American alpha feeling or Putin's flexing of power. So I'm all right for the moment.