World War Three

[Wind]

I don't usually like to link stuff from Russell Brand outside his thread anymore, but he had some decent thoughts here about the situation.


Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QnevpbkFrPE

According to Canadian intelligence reports, China was supposed to launch an attack on Taiwan concurrent to the invasions of Ukraine (just as I suspected) to take advantage of the confusion and distraction caused by it. After seeing the Western reaction and the heavy-handed sanctions levelled on Russia, the changed their minds. For now. Presumably, they are waiting for the right moment to launch their attack and would prefer to choose a time when the West is the weakest and most distracted.

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VNZ0so0LCoM



Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fk5DgCwdTCw

[Chris]

It is great to look at a situation from a distance and with a bit of hindsight, rather than in the fog of war.

Must say, things aren't going too badly for the rest of the world and they are going rather badly for Russia, which is as it should be, given they are the aggressors in this particular situation.

Most analysts expected Ukraine to fall within a couple of weeks, but those predictions were wide off the mark. It would appear we could be facing a Spanish civil war situation, where a multi-year conflict, with fascists on one side (that would be Putin and the Russians, despite their mindless propaganda) and a multinational coalition with thousands of volunteers from all over the world on the other side, fight it out in a war of attrition.

It doesn't look like Russia has the military strength to take and particularly to hold the whole of Ukraine, perhaps they'll stick to the Eastern and Southern parts and install a puppet government in Kyiv, once it falls. The siege of Kyiv is yet to commence, as they are waiting for the advancing forces from the East to reach Kyiv and logistics to catch up west and north of the capital. Once everything is in place, probably in a week or so, they'll lay waste to Kyiv, possibly even raze it to the ground. They're already doing it to Kharkiv, which is the country's second city.

I am surprised by China's reaction, instead of standing by their russian ally, they are distancing themselves and taking a neutral stance, even cooperating with some of the Western sanctions that are laying waste on Russia's economy.

I am actually more optimistic than I was a week ago, Putin looks isolated and the Russian people are not amused, especially the oligarchs. I read somewhere that they detained a Russian private jet in the arctic region of Canada, now the passengers are Stuck in Yellowknife, which is Canada's equivalent of Siberia. Oligarchs can't even overfly the civilised world, let alone visit it or live in it and their assets are being confiscated all over the place, so they must really be pissed off. Ordinary Russians were used to certain creature comforts, like buying Western goods and taking trips to places like London or France, now that is gone too. In terms of their isolation, they're almost back to Soviet times, which they won't be happy about.

I'm starting to think Putin might actually end up like Milosevic, overthrown by his own people and shipped off to the ICC in the Hague to face charges for war crimes.

[Emil El Zapato]

Here goes that fascination with white phos again

I worked with an Army Ranger and helicopter pilot for a number of years, he was part of the Iraq war (1991 version) and he always use to joke about Willie Pete ...

He said once, how unsettled the American forces were going into the Iraq War because of the T-72 tanks. He said they ended up being a pushover.

When I worked with him he also joked about when on training maneuvers, he and his mates would shine spotlights and infrared on migrants trying to cross the Mexican/American border. He thought it was hilarious.

[Emil El Zapato]

Apparently, that Reddit post about the Texas guy was true:

American veteran Russell 'Texas' Bentley says the only way he'll ever return to the U.S. is if he's on a Russian tank arriving to "liberate" America.

Bentley has been based in the Donbas region of Ukraine since December 2014 when he arrived from Texas to fight with a pro-Russian militant group in the Donetsk People's Republic.

Speaking exclusively to Newsweek, 61-year-old Bentley said he has no intention of ever returning to the United States because he'd be arrested on "some bogus bulls*** charge" but also because there's currently no place he'd rather live than Donbas.

"I'm sure that if I went back to the United States, I would be met at the plane by cops and put in chains and never see the light of day again," Bentley told Newsweek.

As a young man, Bentley served in the United States army before gaining an honorable discharge. During his time out in Ukraine, Bentley says he has served on the front lines with the Russian militant group the Vostok Battalion, but is staying out of the current conflict as he prefers life as a veteran more than a soldier.

Bentley echoes Vladimir Putin's unfounded claims that Russia's invasion of Ukraine is aimed at removing neo-Nazis from the "fascist" Ukrainian government, and the only way he'd return to America is if it were part of the same mission.

"If I return to the U.S., it'll be on a Russian tank to liberate the U.S. just like what we're doing here," Bentley said.

[Chris]

Apparently, that Reddit post about the Texas guy was true:

American veteran Russell 'Texas' Bentley says the only way he'll ever return to the U.S. is if he's on a Russian tank arriving to "liberate" America.

Bentley has been based in the Donbas region of Ukraine since December 2014 when he arrived from Texas to fight with a pro-Russian militant group in the Donetsk People's Republic.

Speaking exclusively to Newsweek, 61-year-old Bentley said he has no intention of ever returning to the United States because he'd be arrested on "some bogus bulls*** charge" but also because there's currently no place he'd rather live than Donbas.

"I'm sure that if I went back to the United States, I would be met at the plane by cops and put in chains and never see the light of day again," Bentley told Newsweek.

As a young man, Bentley served in the United States army before gaining an honorable discharge. During his time out in Ukraine, Bentley says he has served on the front lines with the Russian militant group the Vostok Battalion, but is staying out of the current conflict as he prefers life as a veteran more than a soldier.

Bentley echoes Vladimir Putin's unfounded claims that Russia's invasion of Ukraine is aimed at removing neo-Nazis from the "fascist" Ukrainian government, and the only way he'd return to America is if it were part of the same mission.

"If I return to the U.S., it'll be on a Russian tank to liberate the U.S. just like what we're doing here," Bentley said.

If you ask me, people like that are exactly like those 1930s British and American Nazis who idolised Hitler.

Few people realise how close we came to the entire Western World turning fascist and it seems history is repeating itself.

Putin has dropped his mask and revealed that he was Adolf Hitler all along. Nobody has any illusions about China, North Korea and their concentration camps. Trump very nearly instigated a fascist takeover in the US. They almost won. But like last time, they will be defeated again.

[Emil El Zapato]

If you ask me, people like that are exactly like those 1930s British and American Nazis who idolised Hitler.

Few people realise how close we came to the entire Western World turning fascist and it seems history is repeating itself.

Putin has dropped his mask and revealed that he was Adolf Hitler all along. Nobody has any illusions about China, North Korea and their concentration camps. Trump very nearly instigated a fascist takeover in the US. They almost won. But like last time, they will be defeated again.

yeah, maybe it is clear that the authoritarian is a diminishing species.

[Dreamtimer]

This ongoing event has led to me looking into more spiritual and esoteric sources to see how it may play out and what the energies are. It did not look good in the cards for Putin, and that turned out to be the case. It looks dicey but not terrible for Zelenskyy. And in the states we will turn away from the fascism to a much more feminine energy. The energies are moving away from the patriarchy and into a matriarchal energy. This includes a feminine energy, possibly a female, in the Presidency for 2024.

So far, so good. But we've got a slog ahead of us for sure.

Putin now acts like an abusive husband who will 'kill her if he can't have her'. He's not a strong man anymore. And the west now is more united than I would ever have predicted.

[Emil El Zapato]

This ongoing event has led to me looking into more spiritual and esoteric sources to see how it may play out and what the energies are. It did not look good in the cards for Putin, and that turned out to be the case. It looks dicey but not terrible for Zelenskyy. And in the states we will turn away from the fascism to a much more feminine energy. The energies are moving away from the patriarchy and into a matriarchal energy. This includes a feminine energy, possibly a female, in the Presidency for 2024.

So far, so good. But we've got a slog ahead of us for sure.

Putin now acts like an abusive husband who will 'kill her if he can't have her'. He's not a strong man anymore. And the west now is more united than I would ever have predicted.

I feel it is for the wrong reason, DT, if only the world had that kind of commitment for peace, compassion, and each other.

[Dreamtimer]

You have to unite and start talking before you can move towards peace. This is a first step. People are sick and tired of war, have much more voice and awareness, and will push their leadership in the direction of peace. It's much harder to get away with bullshit when people can see in real time events unfolding.

[Wind]

The Field of Peace

by Charles Eisenstein

"John Perkins once told me a story of bringing a group to have an audience with the Dalai Lama. A woman asked him, “Is it important to pray for peace?” The Dalai Lama said, “Yes, praying for peace is very good, but if that is all you do you are wasting your time.”

What he meant is that prayers will have no effect if they are not aligned with action. It makes sense—if I pray for one thing and enact its opposite, whoever hears the prayer is going to be confused. Which is it that you want, X or Y? Which is it that you want, peace or war?

I read this morning of an upcoming parley between Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky. Do not think that it will be easy for either one of them to turn the locomotive of war in its tracks once it has built up such momentum. Each surely has a robust set of beliefs in which his side is the righteous party.

In the case of Zelensky, the righteousness is obvious: foreign troops have invaded my country’s territory and are killing my people. The horror of the onslaught is plain for all to see.

In the case of Putin, the righteousness comes, I suppose, from an historical narrative of NATO expansionism, missiles on Russia’s borders, oppression and mass killing of ethnic Russians in the Ukraine, and so forth.

The point here is not that each side is equally right. It is that each side believes it is right. In that mindset, justice and righteousness are the result of victory over the opponent. Short of the opponent’s total capitulation, to make any other peace is to compromise justice.

Unlikely though it may seem, let us hold the possibility of peace from this meeting. Here is one scenario: Russia agrees to an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of all troops from Ukraine. Ukraine agrees to become a demilitarized country like Costa Rica. The Donbass region’s status will be determined in an internationally-supervised referendum. Zelensky’s government remains in power. And let me add a flourish: a nonviolent Peace Witness Corps from all over the world, armed only with cameras, comes to Ukraine to keep peace and help rebuild.

To reach an agreement like that would take something of a miracle. We certainly can’t pin our hopes on Vladimir Putin’s compassion, although judging from his interviews I don’t think he is a heartless man. Hardened, yes, and shrewd, but not the soulless monster war propaganda portrays. (That is a heavy accusation to make against another human being, but we tend to make it lightly in the heat of conflict. If you don’t believe me, look at Twitter.) In any case, even if Putin had the peace consciousness of Nelson Mandela, and even if Zelensky were not utterly dependent on a bellicose imperial power, still it would be hard for them to make peace now that the self-feeding fire of war fever has been ignited. If they make peace, both Zelensky and Putin will face intense criticism from militants in their own countries and abroad, who will accuse them of capitulation, appeasement, or weakness. Zelensky in particular will essentially be ending Ukraine’s status as a pawn of the West and will thus bear the fury of the US establishment that is at present howling for escalation.

How then can we recall the aggressors to their humanity? The world must stand in solidarity for peace. We must not pretend to tolerate the intolerable, nor cooperate with it. We must be loud in our revulsion, and express our noncooperation in the form of sanctions and boycotts. And not only in opposition to this war. If we are to be consistent, we must also look with shame at the wars instigated by our own country as we lived obliviously to them, shielded from their horrible reality by our own justifications just as Putin is shielded by his. We must stand in solidarity not only with the innocent victims of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but with all war victims, present and future. It is psychologically and politically easy right now to condemn and boycott Russia, but if we don’t stand with equal fervor against militarism generally, we are not truly serving peace.

A prayer for peace has no force if one is an aggressor oneself. Are the calls to protect the victims of Putin’s war motivated by compassion only, when they happen also to fit into an imperial narrative? We in the West are allowed, encouraged even, to witness their suffering; meanwhile the suffering of those who are incidental to American imperialism or stand in its way is made invisible, and when someone like Chelsea Manning or Julian Assange shows it to us we (as a nation) react by imprisoning the messenger. Those of us who truly want peace will not stand for that either.

The awful fear, grief, and suffering the American public is seeing now through images and videos is not just the reality of the Ukraine war; it is the reality of war, period. Usually it is beyond our sight, hidden behind ideology, justifications, propaganda, normalization, desensitization, and ignorance.

A true prayer for peace cannot be only “Let this war end.” It must be nothing less than “Let all war end.” It would extend the sanctions against Russia to non-compliance with all militarism, including our own.

We are rightly appalled at the invasion of Ukraine. But where were these sensibilities when our own countries and alliances invaded Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and countless other countries? In many cases these invasions wreaked devastation far, far beyond what Ukraine has suffered. The point here is not to distract from Russia’s action with what-about-ism, nor is it to decry hypocrisy. I am more interested in results, not in blame. I want our peace work to be effective. It will not be so, if it selects only the wars of our enemies.

On an immediate, practical level, protests, boycotts, and sanctions give Russia an incentive to make peace. However, their main power is moral; no country will bow to sanctions if it believes it is in the right. The boycotts and non-compliance that Gandhi inspired were effective because they carried moral force, not (primarily) because they crippled the colonial economy. Exercised by hypocrites, sanctions have little effect. A much stronger response would embed sanctions in an authentic peace declaration. “We will no longer stand for war. We will dismantle our global military bases. We will disband NATO. We will stop placing missiles on your borders. We will rejoin the ABM treaty. We will reduce our nuclear arsenal. We will shrink our military. We will stop invading other countries. We will cease supporting coups, juntas, and torture regimes.” Then we would generate a political and psychic field of peace in which war becomes impossible to sustain. Otherwise, if we don’t commit to demilitarization alongside our denunciation of the Russian invasion, we still affirm the principle: “War is OK as long as it is justified.” Well guess what: Everyone thinks their own war is justified. Most ordinary Russians fervently believe theirs is right now.



Just as integrity requires the peace activist to denounce not only adversary nations’ wars but also their own, just as anti-war exhortations have no power if they come with hypocrisy, so too are our prayers weak when they are inconsistent with our actions. The more we serve peace day to day in personal life, the stronger our prayers become.

If you care about Ukraine, please join together in generating a coherent pscyho-political field of peace. Prayer by itself will not generate that field, but it can firm one’s intention to hold peace and compassion in all relationships. Every time we let go of self-righteousness, we strengthen the field of peace. Every time we resist a call to arms, every time we put ourselves in another’s shoes, every time we act from the knowledge that we are not separate, every time we look for someone’s humanity and divinity when it hurts, we tilt the course of distant events into alignment with those choices.

It is hard work, because war thinking is a deep program in the human mind, carving up of the world into us and them, friend and enemy, hero and villain, good guy and bad guy. So quick is the reflex to see someone I disagree with as a monster, to write them off. When I do that, they often fulfill my expectation.

Writ large, that explains a lot of what is playing out on the international stage. After the Cold War, the United States was desperate for an Enemy by which to define itself as good (and maintain the profits of the armaments industry). For twenty years US foreign policy been writing the role that Russia now plays ( casting it as adversary, encircling it with bases, nullifying missile treaties). The arrogant, violent bully generates enemies in the image of his paranoid fear that others are as he is. The question of whether Putin and Russia are actually evil misses the point. If they are, we have created the conditions for them to be thus. The bully’s enemies may indeed be as brutal as he is, or even more so. The point is that he has created them. Yet even at this late date, it is not too late to de-identify with the roles we’ve set up that make conflict inevitable.

Holding the field of compassion in our political discourse is especially important given the fact that warmongers invariably use the suffering of innocent victims to justify even more war, producing even more innocent victims. Everyone has a reason why bombing and shooting and killing by their own side is regrettably necessary.

Will the ancient pattern continue forever? Has anything in human nature changed that will deliver us from the cycle of war begetting war and hate begetting hate? Actually, something has changed. We are in a new age of humanity—call it an age of compassion, of reunion, of interbeing—inaugurated, paradoxically, by the most murderous human invention ever: nuclear weapons. Radioactive blowback and mutually assured destruction offer a stern lesson in interconnection: I cannot escape the consequences I visit upon the Other. A corollary is that matters of right and wrong are no longer to be solved by force. Paradoxically, the mightiest force ever conceived has made force obsolete as a final solution. Before the nuclear age, war carried the prospect of total victory over an annihilated enemy. No longer. The age has turned. Nukes limit the degree to which even the most bloodthirsty are willing to escalate conflict, but the principle extends to non-nuclear conflicts too. Even when the United States faces a puny opponent, still total victory eludes its grasp. All the more so with a powerful opponent like Russia. Regardless of who is good and who is evil in this conflict, the traditional solution of victory over evil by force is not possible. We face the necessity of another kind of solution, a new and unfamiliar storyline.

If we follow it, we head toward a much greater miracle than merely peace in the Ukraine. It is the dismantling of empire, the termination of the military-industrial complex, the closure of 800 US military bases worldwide, the institution of a true global Peace Witness Corps and a dramatic shrinkage of all militaries globally. Until this happens, something like Ukraine will recur again and again, whether instigated (as is usual) by the US imperial hegemon or by the adversaries it generates from its us-versus-them worldview. Can’t we write another plot for the human drama?

On every level, from the geopolitical to the intimate, it is time to live that new storyline. Only if we do it in our own conflicts can we reasonably hope that the politicians may do so as well. How we act is a claim on human nature and a declaration of what is possible. So let us pray for peace, yes, in preparation to be peace ourselves. May we look first for the humanity and divinity of all we meet. May we be free of all vestiges of the habit of organizing the world into good guys and bad guys. May we see and cease our own role in the creation of enemies. May we believe so strongly in the possibility of compassion of others that we become a walking invitation that calls it forth into reality. And finally, as we live this prayer, may we see it reflected in global events. In fact, let us insist that it be so."

[Wind]

I just checked and that blog post is one week old now, but I think the main point is still relevant. What kind of a world we truly want?

[Dreamtimer]

When resources dry up, dynamics change.

From Mark Hachman,

If you were wondering about whether the Russians really influence our social media, compare the list of top Facebook posts from a few weeks ago to this week, when Russia couldn't access its foreign cash reserves. Rather telling.

[Emil El Zapato]

Not the beginning nor the end of REAL history.

The International Spectator 2/2005

The forms taken by the war in Chechnya are, due to their political implications, cause for deep-seated concern that extends well beyond the limited geographic area of the small Caucasian republic. The actions perpetrated by Chechen guerrillas between May and September 2004 - from the assassination of Akhmad Kodyrov, head of the pro-Russian government, to the incursion into Ingushetia and a series of terrorist operations culminating in the tragedy in the school in Beslan, Ossetia - have given the lie to official propaganda and demonstrated the extreme gravity of a situation that risks spilling over into the entire northern Caucasus. The persistence of a centuriesí old conflict between the two nations is motivated, as will be seen, by the unresolved opposition of interests and values to which both sides refer to legitimate their actions. Having developed in successive phases characterised by the multiplication of reciprocal acts of violence, the conflict has become increasingly tough, making the prospect of a negotiated solution inspired by criteria of reasonable realism extremely remote. Dragging on now for more than five years, the second Chechen war, despite Russia’s massive campaign, remains unresolved from a military point of view and a failure from a political one - apart from having produced a humanitarian catastrophe.

The choice of war

Although tactical considerations have led the Russian authorities to defer the question of separatism, giving priority to the terrorist threat, it has always remained in the background. There seems to be a deeply rooted awareness of the precarious equilibrium between the centre and the periphery - emphasised by the incongruencies of the federal experience of recent years - resulting from the country’s size and the national, ethnic and religious diversity of its peoples (minority groups, of which a half are Muslim, account for almost 20 percent of the total).

The precedent set by the breakdown of the Soviet Union under the impetus of the Baltic, Ukrainian and Georgian secessionist movements added further reasons for concern, above all as regards control of the republics in the northern Caucasus. In fact, the picture offered by that area of great strategic and economic importance and characterised by widespread inter-ethnic tensions infected by the virus of Islamic fundamentalism is not comforting, especially at a time of difficulty in inter-state relations between Russia and Georgia, which lies along its southern border. The Chechens’ demands for independence are seen as a potential cause of instability in that they could - through the so-called domino effect - trigger a widespread separatist trend, threatening Moscow’s influence in the region.

The separatist rebel forces invoke universal values of justice in the context of national liberation movements against colonialism. The specific reference is to the right to self-determination which, under certain conditions, legitimates the aspirations of an ethnic community to seek independence, in direct opposition to the right of a sovereign state to defend its territorial integrity in the maintenance of international order. These objectively irreconcilable principles set down in the UN Charter, both of high legal and ethical value, give equal importance to the demands of both antagonists in case of ethnic conflict. Hence the embarrassment of the Russian authorities in a situation that gives their adversary a position if not of advantage at least as equal, impacting negatively on the legitimacy of their political and military actions. And hence the emphasis the Kremlin has put on the terrorist actions and criminal infiltrations in the separatist movement in an attempt to undermine the credibility gained by the Chechen forces in their fight for independence.

The equation “terrorism equals separatism”, instrumentally underscored by the Russians, is also meant to respond to criticism from both inside and outside the country for the ruthless way in which military operations are being conducted and the consequent widespread violations of human rights. The attacks of 11 September 2001 allowed Russia to present itself as a great power engaged alongside the West in the fight against the common enemy - international terrorism. In return, it could claim an important international role and obtain greater tolerance, especially from the US, towards the excesses registered in the war in Chechnya. To justify the widely documented brutality of the federal troops, the Russian authorities have resorted to arguments that are implicitly accepted today by many governments that use extreme forms of repression to deal with the terrorist threat.

Another factor that has added to the complexity of this war is the link between Islamic fundamentalism and the radical component of the Chechen rebel movement - more inclined towards terrorism - which is fighting to create a unified Islamic state in the Caucasus. The external contribution of volunteers, arms and financing provided by a galaxy of fundamentalist organisations poses a problem for the Kremlin, as concerns both the possible stances its Muslim community may take, and political, diplomatic and economic relations with a number of Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq.

The many factors at play - independence, terrorism, crime, Islamic fundamentalism - contribute to explaining the Kremlin’s ambivalent, if not downright contradictory attitude towards the internal and external causes of the conflict. In an initial stage, coinciding with the 1994-96 war, the conflict was presented as a challenge to state authorities on the part of secessionist Chechen forces, allowing the Kremlin to claim its exclusive right - as national authority - to find a solution, in opposition to calls for mediation by the international community. With the launching of the second intervention in 1999 and subsequently in reaction to the Beslan tragedy, the Kremlin decided to give more emphasis to the threat of an external enemy, alluding to an action supported by international terrorist forces.

As a result of, among other things, the rigid censure imposed by the Kremlin, the war that is bloodying the Caucasian republic is marked by a lack of transparency in the management of military operations and parallel political initiatives. The tangle of interests involved is not limited to those of Russians vs Chechens, but also involves groups and factions on both sides. Once again, this multiplicity of actors highlights the complexity of ìnew warsî characterised by asymmetry between the forces fielded, in this case approximately 100,000 Russian troops and security personnel against a few thousand Chechens.

With the transition to guerrilla warfare after the initial phase of direct confrontation, the level of conflict increased not so much because of renewed impetus in affirming the ideals of independence, patriotism, etc, but because of the conditions of psychological, cultural and strategic tension in which the war unfolded. Chechnya, starting with the capital Grozny, was hit by a wave of uncontrolled destruction, causing large numbers of victims among the civilian population, subjected to both the brutality of the Russian and collaborationist contingents and to pressure from the radical rebel groups linked to Islamic extremism. The ever increasing recourse by Chechens to terrorism as a means of struggle can be seen as a reaction to the extreme brutality of the repression, even if it has strengthened the Kremlin’s arguments justifying intervention. The suicide bombings carried out by “women martyrs” - a manifestation of the so-called “Palestinianisation” of the conflict - reveal the deep crisis of a society devastated by violence.

In the summer of 2002, more than two years after the beginning of the intervention, the situation of stalemate between the two sides and the evident decline in popular consensus for the Russian government’s actions were causing concern for the Russia executive, especially Putin. Exponents of the Russian political world, European governments and organisations such as the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were pressing for attempts to be made to reach a negotiated solution.

Divide et impera

The Moscow hostage crisis in October of the same year, of which the management by the Russian authorities was much criticised, marked a turning point in official policy, putting an end to all hypotheses of negotiations with the rebels. A new course known as “Chechenisation” was undertaken. It called for a downsizing of direct Russian involvement in the republic, while giving the administration in Grozny more responsibility. Members of the Chechen elite willing to collaborate with the occupants were co-opted into the local power system to promote a strategy well tested during Tsarist and Soviet times, based on the principle of “divide and rule”. This line was formally sanctioned in 2003 with a referendum on the new Constitution and elections for a new president tasked with re-establishing stability in Chechnya.

The Russian plan to find a way out of the Chechen impasse by means of strong economic and security concessions to the republican authorities had the fault of being strongly biased. The main shortcoming of a process that was to bring into being an administration supported by popular consensus was the exclusion of a crucial component in the Chechen equilibria, the separatists. The underlying logic was the totally unrealistic conviction that a peace agreement can be reached by choosing oneís interlocutors among allies while ignoring the adversaries. The ballots cast in May and October 2003, although characterised by systematic manipulations (as denounced by Chechen and Russian NGOs, as well as Western organisations including the Council of Europe) satisfied official expectations. Putin had no doubts: “We have resolved the last serious problem relative to the restoration of Russia’s territorial integrity.” As for the real meaning of the vote, it was generally taken to reflect the desire for security and stability ñ linked to an end to Russian occupation ñ of a people traumatised by years of war.

The novelty of the new Constitution was that in principle it granted the formally sovereign republican authorities a certain degree of autonomy so as to strengthen their prestige in the citizens’ eyes. As this commitment contradicted the official policy of centralisation pursued in the previous three years through the creation of strict control structures, it is no wonder that the division of competences between Moscow and Grozny has still not been defined. The newly elected Chechen president, Akhmad Kadyrov, designated by the Kremlin, was a leading figure in the narrow Chechen elite and had been a collaborationist from the beginning of the conflict. A religious and rising political leader with his own following, for the Russians he represented the strongman of the moment who had to be supported to enable progress along the road to Chechenisation.

Significant was the policy’s inherent ambiguity: it was to be pursued by a man who, aware of the irremovable ties between Russia and Chechnya, on the one hand, was willing to take a subordinate role, while on the other, driven by personal ambition, clan interests and a sincere attachment to the Chechen nation, was keen on ensuring some margin of initiative for himself. There was also the unsolved problem of the degree of autonomy that the Russian government was actually willing to concede the Chechen administration: while acting as an antidote to independentist aspirations it was not supposed to erode Russian influence in the region. Subject to contrasting pressures, this delicate position was ably managed by the new president. As head of the new government, Kadyrov aggressively pursued - also in hopes of strengthening his personal influence - the promotion of national values, the re-establishment of internal order and a relaunching of the economy.

However, the shortcomings of a policy compromised from the outset by the stigma of subordination to Russian power were accentuated by the inefficiency of Grozny’s management of public, marked by widespread corruption and factiousness. As was to be expected, Maskhadov and the independentists were outlawed, sealing an insuperable rift. But even non-aligned exponents of the influential Chechen diaspora in Moscow were not brought in. In preferring not to broaden his base to seek the consensus needed to undertake a process of normalisation, Kadyrov revealed his limits: while strong tactically, he lacked a constructive political strategy open to Chechen society.

Kadyrov’s assassination in May 2004, less than a year after his mandate began, brought this course to a brusque halt. It also made manifest the weakness of a strategy based on the leadership of a single person in such an unstable context, which had already seen the physical elimination of the two previous presidents. Faced with this overwhelming event, the Russian authorities opted for continuity out of fear that a power void in the republic could have destabilising repercussions on the entire Caucasus area. Chechnya, ignored by the official information system throughout this entire period, which took it for granted that - lacking terrorist acts - Russian public opinion, engrossed in its daily problems, would have little interest in such a distant area, suddenly jumped back into the spotlight and was to remain there for the following months.

The death of the strongman in Grozny hit Putin hard, as he had made the fight against Chechen separatism and terrorism one of the basic planks of his political platform. Determined to go ahead with the progressive restructuring of the state system undertaken in previous years, the Russian president found himself faced with a problem that could take on national dimensions, compromising the whole operation. Given the emergency situation, the Kremlin’s first reaction to the massive incursion of rebel forces into the neighbouring republic of Ingushetia, taken to signal a possible spread of the conflict throughout the northern Caucasus, was to persevere in its original plan. Confirmation of the Chechenisation policy meant election of a new president in the person of collaborationist general Alu Alkhanov, flanked by the son of the assassinated president, Razman, head of the feared pro-Russian militia.

Beslan and the “strong state”

This strategy had not yet been implemented when - confirming the pessimistic predictions of the risks of a spillover of the conflict ñ the situation precipitated with the sortie of a terrorist commando into the neighbouring republic of Ossetia. The tragedy in the school in Beslan profoundly changed the Russian authorities’ and public opinion’s perception of the context in which the war was taking place. The convulsive management of the crisis and its disastrous conclusion made it evident to all that the situation was out of control, the result of the devastating intersection of a lack of political acumen, incompetence on the part of the secret services, and the ferocious determination of the terrorist commando.

Assessments vary as to the meaning of the terrorist action, its organisation, the identity of those who perpetrated it and those behind it, and its motivations. The diverse possible interpretations, leading to different political choices, all derived from one basic question: does the conflict have prevalently internal or external roots? Assuming that the raid in Ossetia was not linked to the Chechen situation and had to be considered a separate act aimed at destabilising the Caucasian area, the Russian authorities stuck to their thesis, maintained throughout the years, that the action was organised with foreign support. An atmosphere of suspicion settled in on the Kremlin, inspired by the “foreign enemy” formula often used during the Soviet period. Putin declared, “... What we are facing is direct intervention of international terror directed against Russia. This is a total, cruel and full-scale war....”

Thus security - found to be lacking as a result of the inefficiency of the secret services and intelligence ñ suddenly became the testbed of the prestige, even if not the popularity, of the Russian president, promoter of the strong Russian state, now revealed in all its weakness. The unprecedented increase in budget resources that followed, of which more than one third were allocated to the Ministries of the Interior and of Defence, reflected the effort made to bring lustre back to those sectors of the state machine that had traditionally guaranteed its greatness. It is symptomatic that after the Beslan tragedy, Putin expressed nostalgia for the Soviet past, when Russia was seen, in his words, as “an impressive state and a great power”. Reference to the strong state returned with all the rhetorical emphasis demanded by the deliberately dramatised atmosphere in an appeal to the values of militant patriotism. The need for military opposition to what was presented as a threat to the survival of the Russian nation was used to justify a decisive step in the process of consolidating state structures. The measures proposed on election reform and reform of the system of nominating presidents of the regions and the republics - the spearhead of what the Russian press called the “September revolution” - were the final touches put on the “executive vertical” system of power. There seems to be something to the idea that the recent terrorist escalation offered Putin the opportunity to implement during his second term a plan for economic and political restructuring that he had already been considering for some time. Not unlike in autumn 1991 at the end of Yeltsin era, when a series of terrorist acts “fortuitously” coincided with a demanding moment in the regime’s development which, putting the accent on security, called for the mobilisation of the people in favour of the path taken.

The measures presented in the Duma revealed a trend which can rightfully be defined as authoritarian, starting with the reform of centre/periphery relations which openly questioned the functionality of the current federal system. Motivated by the dysfunctions of the republican administrations brought to the fore by the incapacity of Ingushetian and Ossetian presidents, Murat Zjazikov and Alexander Dzasoxov, respectively, to cope with the Beslan crisis, the policy of transfer of powers to the central authorities in Moscow was confirmed. The cancellation of presidential elections, replaced by direct nominations by the Kremlin, is of particular concern, especially as regards the republics in the northern Caucasus, as it will probably exclude the more representative local leaders. All of this took place in an atmosphere in which the evocation of local nationalisms - as demonstrated by the growing tensions between traditionally contrasting communities such as Ingush and Ossetians, Circassians and Karachays, Kabardians and Balkarians, and various Daghestani groups ñ could undermine the precarious equilibria that uphold the complex ethnic mosaic in the North Caucasus

Therefore, above and beyond the Chechen case, the situation in the region is one of latent instability which the Kremlin’s current centralising policy does not seem to be able to tackle. Confiscating the rights of the electorate and annulling their prerogatives of representation of local interests reduces the margin of interaction between local communities and the Moscow administration, weakening the latter’s base of legitimacy. The policy could even compromise the plans for support of the Caucasian economies, above all that of Chechnya, drawn up in the awareness that only an improvement in the quality of life can reduce the causes of the widespread social tensions in those republics - unemployment, poverty, crime.

This centralisation of power has been paralleled by further fragmentation of the Chechen rebel forces, who have lost even more of those original characteristics that to some extent made them a coordinated military formation. Today, they are simply armed groups sometimes intent on banditry, largely responding to the rules of the clan. The events in Beslan, claimed in a mad declaration to have been perpetrated by Basaev, and firmly condemned by the deposed president Mashkadov, alarmed by the loss in terms of image of the independentist cause, led to an apparently definitive break between the radical Islamist wing and the pragmatic lay one. Mashkadovís position was tricky: under pressure from the terrorist groups on the one hand and the Russian authorities on the other, he found it increasingly difficult to control the rebel forces’ initiatives.

A direct result of the conflict, with its violence and humiliations - and this could have unexpected consequences - has been another profound change in the Chechen resistance movement. The younger generation that has grown up with the war no longer takes up arms to demand independence but is mainly driven by feelings of desperation and revenge. The rebellion - having transcended all motivations - has become an end in itself. In parallel, the catchment area for recruits has spread to other ethnic groups besides the Chechens: the Ingush, the Kabardians, the Daghestani.

Impossible negotiations

The proliferation of episodes of violence in a vicious circle of terrorist acts and retaliatory operations has exasperated relations between the two sides, making the promotion of negotiations difficult even on a procedural level. In fact, those in favour of negotiations both among the Chechen rebels and above all in the Russian hierarchy have become so marginalised that it is highly unlikely that they would be able to play an interlocutory role in seeking a solution to the conflict. A new element however was the decision last fall by moderate Chechen leader Umar Khambiev, former Minister of Health 28 Vladimir Putin and the Chechen War in Mashkadovís government, to renounce independence on the condition that this would correspond to a UN-sponsored process of gradual demilitarisation and democratisation of Chechnya able to ensure an effective political role for local authorities in the framework of a regime of real autonomy.

But the opening towards an agreement on the Kremlin’s crucial point of the state’s territorial integrity came too late. The time for negotiations had definitively passed for a number of reasons. First of all, the dubious representativeness of those proposing the negotiations, discredited by accusations against their leader, Mashkadov, of complicity in recent terrorist acts. Secondly, the vague nature of the proposal, which immediately triggered divisions as to its possible implications among some of the very members of the moderate Chechen group that supported it. Third, the Kremlin’s reluctance to accept outside mediation, which it has always considered as damaging to its own prerogatives, especially at a time when affirmation of state sovereignty is one of its main policies. Finally, Mashkadov’s elimination by Russian forces in March 2005, after he had announced a unilateral ceasefire, marked another step in the escalation of the conflict, inevitably increasing the weight of the more extremist factions on both sides.

Considering these negative factors, which fit perfectly into the overall picture that has characterised the Russian-Chechen conflict till now, there seems to be no possibility of a negotiated solution. In fact, only the emergence of some new elements able to change the Kremlin’s intransigent stance can the way for further developments between the two antagonists - and this seems quite unlikely in the current phase of its unrelenting opposition. Therefore, the most plausible scenario is indefinite continuation of the armed conflict, punctuated - as are other asymmetric conflicts ñ by the constant repetition of terrorist acts and repressive actions. A conflict in which the predominant actor does not seem to be willing to make any concessions and is intent on winning at all costs while the other, inferior in capabilities, is more determined than ever not to concede defeat, is bound to drag on. This means that the “longest war in Europe since 1945” may end - or at least attenuate - only when Russian and collaborationist forces, combining economic inducements and military pressure, manage to subjugate an exhausted and overwhelmed society, reduced in number and therefore unable to offer the residual rebel forces an effective base.

[Dreamtimer]

A little girl in a shelter sings a song and all goes quiet.

[Chris]

Not much going on in the war these past few days. The Russian advance has pretty much stalled, due to insufficient logistics and planning. The Russian army is scrambling to catch up and resupply its overextended battle lines. Troops are regrouping and preparing an all-out assault on the civilian infrastructure of Ukraine's major cities, Kyiv and Kharkiv in particular, but also Odessa if they can get there in the next few days.

Once the siege of Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odessa starts in earnest, expect mass casualties and even more outraged headlines. Mass rapes of Ukrainian women has already started, as is customary for Russian soldiers. A tiny titbit of historical info here. The reason Germans in ww2 held out until the very last man and tried to keep Russian soldiers out of the country for as long as possible, was that they knew that German women would be raped en masse. That is exactly what happened when they moved in.

On the economic front, sanctions are biting not just in Russia, but in economies that are reliant on Russia in one way or another, especially for energy. Here in Hungary, the local currency went into a nosedive before recovering somewhat. There are now petrol shortages due to the government fixing the price, which means operators are supposed to sell at a loss.

Poland tried to fob off its obsolete MIG-29s in exchange for modern F16-s, so that the US could donate them to Ukraine. Very wisely, the Biden administration said no, as that could be construed as a direct intervention in the war, which as Putin has warned, could precipitate a Nuclear first strike.

Ukrainians are fighting for their homeland fiercely, but there is still very little chance they can win. Russia is going to grind them down and destroy every single Ukrainian city one-by-one, if they have to. The use of battlefield or tactical nukes is a very real possibility. At this point, Putin has crossed the Rubicon, so he won't care about any consequences to his reputation.